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Abstract 
The role of information and communication technology (ICT) in development has 
been discussed from two distinctly different perspectives:  some researchers and 
activists view it as a means for opening new alleys for facilitation of development 
and democracy, while others assess it counterproductive.  Further, it has been 
emphasized that people in cities and rural areas meet ICT in different ways, 
as do people with wealth and education compared to poor people. 
In Africa, Kenya has declared itself as ICT hub, and indeed, two-thirds of the 
population have today access to the internet. The state has emphasized ICT in 
promoting services; attitudes toward communication policies and freedom of 
expression are far more reserved.   
The article discusses ICT and development via the filter of assemblage, a key 
concept in the ontological framework developed by Deleuze and Guattari 
(2004/1980). They draw their framework from dynamic systems theory, 
emphasizing fluidity as well as micro- and macro-level dichotomies.  In this 
article, assemblage is used as a metaphor for ICT domestication in Kenya. When 
communities based on sharing and consistent social order meet new technology, 
the change goes far deeper than to improved services. The basic difference might 
be the fact that a community is constructed on cultural ties developed over time, 
strengthening immobility and stability, while an assemblage is characterized with 
mobility and fluidity. Thus, a system of values, hierarchies and inherited traditions 
is challenged, mixed with ‘new’ problems brought by individualised behaviour.  
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In recent years, sophisticated approaches have been produced to analyse not only the availability 
of ICT-based information but also the effects of its emergence in the media ecology of developing 
societies. The concept of media ecology originates from Harold Innis’ (1951) and Marshall 
McLuhan’s (Carpenter & McLuhan, 1960) works covering the study of media, technology and 
communication and how they affect human environments. Several authorities have drawn a 
general conclusion from these very different studies (Chao & et al., 2017; Shao & Wang, 2017; 
Obijiofor, Murray, & Singh, 2017). They found that a few years after the celebrated introduction of 
new ICT-based channels of expression, the complexities involved can be recognized. The 
domestication of ICT has often tended to turn into a jerky process. There is more information 
available and there are more chances to express one’s views in public, but the collision with 
existing local politics and ideology, media establishments and cultural norms may introduce 
elements of both inclusion and exclusion into the ‘new’ media ecology.  
 
The case of Kenya 
Kenya is simultaneously a representative example of recent communication development in Africa 
and an exception. The weak political institutions and externally-oriented economic system, 
inherited from colonial rule, are recognized not only in Kenya but in many other African countries. 
Infrastructures are weak, and ethnic contradictions are strong and deeply intertwined with 
politics. The state has been reluctant to study the imagined histories in Kenyan media discourse; 
consequently, the history of independent Kenya is characterised by little consensus on historical 
events (Muthongo, 2015). On the other hand, the state is reasonably stable, and the country has 
avoided military rule, social instability and social collapse. However, the violent political clashes 
after the 2007 elections and the bloody attacks in Westgate (in 2013) and Garissa (in 2015) 
indicate how delicate social balance is in a transitional democracy (Hornsby, 2013, pp. 5-18). Most 
recently, the dramatic processes around the presidential elections in 2017 indicate that the 
political system cannot easily solve complex, history based social contradictions. 
 
Kenya has repeatedly been named as a front-runner in sub-Saharan Africa's internet access and 
connectivity. Indeed, the debated African mobile phone revolution is strongly present in Kenya. In 
2002, there were just two mobile phones for every 100 of the country’s 38 million people. In the 
next five years, the number of mobile phones increased from one million to 10 million, and their 
popularity has accelerated since then. Today, the mobile phone penetration rate has reached 88 
per cent, and more than half of these are smartphones (Communications Authority in Kenya, 
2017). Kenya’s internet penetration has now reached almost 78 per cent of the population, while 
the average rate for the whole of Africa remains under 30 per cent 
(http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm).  
 
The M-Pesa banking system, based on the mobile phone, is the flagship project of Kenyan ICT 
progress. It was developed and introduced by private telecommunication companies. M-Pesa has 
been a highly successful project. Even illiterate rural women can use it, thus giving themselves 
slight economic independence. Another flagship has been the Huduma Centres. These are one-
stop shops in the counties to ease access to and payment for government services electronically. 
Today there is a Huduma Centre in every county capital in Kenya, and more and more public 
services have been attached to its supply. Thus, the government has been brought closer to the 
citizens, but of course, the services do not much help village people living far from county capitals. 
Assemblage as a media ecology marker 
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Assemblage is a concept with a variety of meanings in several fields, for example, in philosophy, 
arts, archaeology and palaeontology. This philosophical approach refers to an ontological 
framework developed by Deleuze and Guattari and originally presented in their book A Thousand 
Plateaus (1980). Assemblage theory provides a bottom-up framework for analysing social 
complexity by emphasising fluidity, exchangeability and multiple functionalities. The relationships 
of component parts are not stable and fixed. In a philosophical sense, assemblage originally stems 
from the French word agencement. Critics (among others, Phillips, 2006) have said that through 
narrow, literal English translations, the French term has often been interpreted in a narrow, 
misleading way. Deleuze and Guattari did not use the concept systematically. Several 
philosophers, including DeLanda (2006) and Packer and Wiley (2012), later used the concept with 
slightly varying meanings, but the substance remains the same. Assemblage is a way to describe a 
bottom-up model of mobility and networking. The formation of connections and distribution of 
focus is crossed through the ‘body, brain, tool, and environment’ (Packer & Wiley, 2012), each 
collaborating and competing for attention while being given meaning.  
As shown above, this somewhat obscure concept easily leads to complex philosophical 
considerations. However, in this text, it is mainly used as a metaphor for continuous social mobility 
and the creation and discarding of hierarchies. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the 
constellation of new hierarchies includes some existing elements but leaves out others. In this 
paper, the idea of continuous movement and inclusive/exclusive constellations is central. Such 
processes take place in various layers of society and may lead to unexpected changes.  
Assemblage theory offers an intriguing challenge to conventional configurations of the relations 
between parts and wholes. It argues that wholes are constructed by the coming together of 
separate and individual parts. From the perspective of assemblage theory, parts can function 
autonomously, but they can also become part of assembled wholes, be removed from them, and 
then become part of further yet-to-be-assembled ‘togethers.’  
This text will elaborate on the mechanisms of assemblage that have evolved in the present-day 
media ecology of Kenya and reflect on the social changes which these mechanisms might cause. I 
will discuss the elements that make up the Kenyan mediascape, a term coined by Arjun Appadurai 
(1996). It refers to the electronic and print media in global cultural flows. The mediascape indexes 
the electronic capabilities of production and dissemination and the images of the world created by 
these media. In this paper, the concept of mediascape is extended to cover all channels of 
information distribution in society. The assumption is that today, online services providing 
information to citizens cooperate in the process of forming images of the world.  
The difference between mediascape and media ecology is, in my vocabulary, that the mediascape 
does not carry the same moral and normative nuances as media ecology. Media ecology tends to 
suggest how things should be in order to promote a balanced media atmosphere. Consequently, I 
start with the mediascape and proceed to considerations of the media ecology.  
Mediascape evidence 
Kenya has been an early-bird in Africa with its ICT emphasis, but its progress has been financed to 
a large extent by external sources. There are dozens of government policy blueprints about ICT 
planning, many of them describing ICT as a phenomenon resembling electricity and taking the 
same form all over the world. 
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 According to policy experts (e.g. Gekao, November 2015), the selection of ICT as an emphasis area 
for development around the turn of the century in Kenya was both a deliberate measure and a 
necessity; the population was growing fast, agriculture had not progressed according to plan and 
tourism did not appear as a major branch of income gathering (Kivikuru, 2017). It may well be that 
the selection of ICT as a major emphasis area in social planning was based on a search for the 
common good, but it can also be a fashionable choice, a popular theme that had been on the 
agenda of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), UNESCO, the African Union (AU) and 
several foreign donors.  
Policies: From electricity to food? 
In Kenya, ICT policymaking has been a distinctly top-down process. The point of departure has not 
been ‘ICT for development’, although motivations implicitly carry some developmental aspects, as 
do all social planning in developing countries. An indication of the government’s motivation to 
promote ICT development is the Kenya National ICT Masterplan (2013/14 – 2017/18) covering the 
whole country. It was approved in 2014 and is constructed on three pillars: human resources as a 
prerequisite for ICT progress, development of ICT infrastructure, and the goal of ensuring every 
Kenyan access to public information. The desired outcomes are the availability of a high-quality 
workforce for business and an ‘ICT literate population capable of exploiting ICT products and 
services for improved quality of life’ (Masterplan, 2014, p. 48).  
Thus, the citizens are included in the process, but the strategies to reach the goals for technology 
or workforce qualifications are considerably more detailed than the goals for ICT literacy for the 
public. Perhaps the most ambitious part of Kenyan ICT policies is the plan to provide digital 
learning in every school in the country, from primary schools to universities (The Digital Learning 
Programme, DLP1), requiring the education of more than 300,000 teachers and the acquisition of 
more than a million computers by 2019.  
Kenyan ICT experts are the first to complain about poor implementation of the policies expressed 
in the Masterplan. They see a lack of funds as the main reason, but poor administration is also 
criticised. The huge DLP plan has met a variety of problems, not all of which are explicable by the 
scarcity of funds. However, based on the empirical evidence (Kivikuru, 2017), domestication 
appears to be receiving now more attention from the experts implementing Kenyan ICT policies. 
The Kenyan digital hub is reaching a new crossroads phase after some 20 years of planning. The 
Masterplan with its fixed objectives is being partly replaced by softer and more flexible plans. As 
an expert says (Gekao, November 2015), ICT is no longer viewed as comparable with electricity but 
with food – needed everywhere, but taking different forms in different places. The service sector 
is strongly promoted, while freedom of expression and citizen rights are dealt with carefully by 
decision-makers. So far, ICT policies have mainly focused on public access alone, not on 
possibilities and obstacles of building up social capital (Proenza, 2015, pp. 400-407).  
Media: Increase of channels and mobile-based practices  
The Bill of Rights, a special chapter in the new constitution, was confirmed in 2010. It emphasizes 
freedom of expression and media freedom. However, the dialectic between freedom and 
responsibility in media performance has been difficult to find in Kenya after it gained 
independence in 1963 and after the transfer to a multi-party system in 1992. Although the country 
has enjoyed economic growth in recent decades, the media market is relatively small. However, as 
                                                          
1 https://worldteacheraid.org/digital-learning-programme-in-kenya-schools/ 
 4 
 
happened in South Africa, the change from terrestrial to digital broadcasting technology is 
changing radio and television structures rapidly by promoting television and reducing radio 
audiences (The State of the Media in Kenya, 2014).  
Major media companies have their online platforms. Although there are significant differences in 
the level of sophistication of websites and the amount of traffic on each, the mere fact that they 
have an online presence demonstrates their appreciation of technological advancements and a 
desire to capture and retain the younger audiences (The State of the Media in Kenya, 2014).  
Mobile phones have become a key component in news collection, investigative journalism and 
journalistic activities. For example, the mobile phone is an important companion for journalists 
keen to keep in touch with their newsrooms and editors while on assignment. For a television 
journalist operating outside Nairobi (Eldoret), new technology has changed everything. The work 
of a Kenyan journalist today more resembles the work of television professionals in industrialised 
countries, and increased mobility allows more attention to grassroots efforts. However, the 
gatekeepers in Nairobi are not always motivated to broadcast reports from distant villages. The 
use of new technologies in journalistic practice seems to reflect national contexts and 
circumstances. Even as journalists celebrate new technologies, they still face the same 
professional limitations as before (Kivikuru, 2017). 
Newspaper circulations have been decreasing in recent years. The newspaper clearly remains a 
medium for the urban elites, also papers with somewhat more populist news values (The Star, The 
Nairobian); there is no clear evidence of tabloidization. An analysis of newspaper content carried 
out by the author suggests that the target audiences are distinctly urban elite groups interested in 
party politics.2 
During the 50 years of independence, the basic motive of Kenyan media policies has been to 
support those managing the state rather than to provide the public with relevant information 
(Ugangu, 2015). However, the Kenyan media have undoubtedly gradually opened themselves to 
more independent voices. The lively debates in Kenya’s print media have created envy and 
admiration among its neighbours in East Africa, many of whom have a far more mixed history of 
media freedom. However, Binyavanga Wainaina (2008, p. 17) has described present-day Kenyan 
journalism in the following way: ‘Our media is obsessed with the soap opera of political 
characters. So Kenya is really just a theatre-screen where we watch a few people play drama 
games on stage, and clap, or cry or laugh.’ Kenyan media publicity tends to be an elite exercise. 
Today, part of the clapping or laughing audience operates online, but citizens remain as an 
audience. With the exception of morning radio phone-ins, the ordinary people rarely participate in 
debates about public issues. 
The author’s own rough quantitative-qualitative content analysis supports Wainaina’s cynical 
comments. In November 2016, almost four-fifths of the Daily Nation’s (78%) and The Standard’s 
(76%) daily general news content dealt with national politics, mainly covering issues related to the 
general elections scheduled for August 8, 2017 or corruption cases that often had links with both 
politics and economy. Only three newspaper issues (of a total of 20) carried a leading front-page 
                                                          
2 Issues of Daily Nation, The Standard November 17-26, 2016; Daily Nation, The Standard in November 18-24, 2015; 
issues of The Star and The Nairobian November 2016. The quantitative analysis was based on headline counting, not 
volumes. 
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story covering anything other than national politics and/or corruption. The style of reporting was 
exclusive, not motivating readers to debate and discussion. The reporting was strongly person-
centred, the style remaining neutral but keeping the big names on the agenda day after day. 
Explicit or implicit details of the behaviour of the persons described revealed their ethnic 
connections by reporting on certain traditions, colours and scarfs, and pictures were essential 
markers of this. Interestingly, the style of reporting in the online platforms of the papers studied 
was distinctly more discussion-oriented than in the mother media, and there was more county-
level news, although most of this was linked to the coming elections. 
In the previous year (November 2015), there was somewhat less reporting of national politics, 
which accounted for 63 per cent of The Nation’s and 67 per cent of The Standard’s general news 
content. Both papers regularly published local (county) news, but as modest, minimal-size pieces 
mainly covering accidents, diseases, weather problems, oddities and local politics. The local press 
is almost non-existent. 
A recent study (Ireri et al, 2017) discusses the agenda-setting power of the two main newspapers’ 
ability to influence public opinion about corruption, devolution, economic crisis, insecurity, 
poverty and unemployment. According to this quantitative study, the two papers covered the six 
studied themes in a strikingly similar manner but had a marginal influence on the Kenyan public 
about the themes. The papers seem to lead a life of their own, distant from the general public. 
Radio is the most inclusive of all the main media. The number of phone-ins to any national station 
is high, especially during the morning programmes, and political issues are also debated. The 
various television channels present regular news bulletins with a few thematic debates on national 
politics every week, but most of programming is oriented toward entertainment. Reality television 
has found its place on public and private television channels, but perhaps even stronger is the 
tendency to support consumerism and middle-class values (e.g. cooking, cars, travel and wedding 
programmes). The news bulletins on both radio and television adopt similar criteria to those of the 
newspapers but with less focus on politics. Local radio stations have a strong local emphasis, but 
local coverage is limited on the national stations. 
Sports reporting in all the major media gave its greatest attention to national-level sports, 
personalities and events, although British sports received continuous attention. Little attention 
was given to international issues during the periods studied. What coverage there was mainly 
comprised news from East African neighbours, international agencies and business information 
from the Western world. 
Media policies: One step behind  
The official media policy and the media policies adopted by the large media companies display 
ambivalence and contradictions. These policies are shaped by colonial histories, postcolonial 
realities and the post-independence development agendas. The older state-inspired normative 
arguments, such as the need for a developmentalist press, still influence policy today. Changes in 
the political space, therefore, shift media policy in a direction that supports the political 
establishment’s objectives. Media policies embrace Kenya’s customs and aspirations, such as 
attitudes to ethnicity, religious and cultural differences and the crafting of a national identity. 
However, the most decisive factor in the Kenyan media system remains unchanged. Politics is 
decisive (Ugangu, 2015).  
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The most interesting phenomenon so far may be that public ICT policies and ICT-based media 
changes have developed separately. Formally, ICT and media matters are dealt with by the same 
ministry (the Ministry of Information, Communications and Technology), but they have been 
developed separately by two different state departments between which there is little 
cooperation. Contradictions arise in the activities on the borderline between ICT and conventional 
media. The most dramatic contradiction appeared in 2015 when the digital migration of television 
broadcasting was being debated. The situation became so difficult that the three main private 
media houses (Nation Media Group, Standard Group and Royal Media Services) went off air for a 
few weeks in protest. One of the benefits of digital migration is the increased variety of channels, 
which in turn means more content for subscribers. Digital signals take less bandwidth, and this has 
allowed for the growth of more channels in Kenya. About 60 per cent of the Kenyan population is 
covered by the digital signal (Communications Authority of Kenya). 
Media consumption: The rise of television 
 According to one survey (Ipsos Synovate, 2011), radio (95% daily) is still the main media source of 
the Kenyan population. An average person listens to three stations weekly, mainly Swahili 
language stations. Radio is used daily as the primary source of news, music and entertainment. 
The average television viewer watches up to three channels in a week, but spends far less time 
watching television than listening to radio. During prime time, most television time is spent 
watching soap operas and news. About 650,000 Kenyans watch television weekly, while the 
equivalent figure for radio listeners is about 4.5 million (The State of the Media in Kenya, 2014).  
Many newspaper readers do not purchase their own copy but rely on a copy from a household 
member or from the office. The key sections of interest in newspapers are local news, sports and 
international news (Ipsos Synovate, 2011). There seems to be a contradiction between the strong 
bias towards national politics of newspaper content and the demand for local news. 
The mediascape in Kenya is changing; television is becoming more popular, competing with radio 
in popularity in towns. In 2013-2014, television viewing grew by 82 per cent, while the equivalent 
figure for radio was only 20 per cent. The main reasons are the change to digital technology and, 
as a consequence, an increase in free-of-charge television channels. Radio very often uses regional 
or vernacular languages, while television is strongly oriented to the English language and imported 
programmes and formats. However, digital migration has now enabled the emergence of local-
language television channels (e.g. KASS TV, 3 Stones), and they have fast become popular (The 
State of the Media in Kenya, 2014). Thus, the language – and locality as an implicit factor – 
appears as a significant reason for a medium’s popularity.  
It can be assumed that the position of the medium of the majority – radio – has become at least 
somewhat weaker, although radio access has improved because of digitalization and mobile 
phone radio listening. The big, strong radio stations have lost audiences, while small, vernacular-
language stations have kept theirs (The State of the Media in Kenya, 2014). These vernacular-
language stations have raised political concerns at the national level where it has been argued that 
the delicate ethnic balance may be at stake (Ogola, 2015). For the same reason, many experts are 
hesitant about the Ministry of Information’s plan to introduce county-level ICT services in the 
dominant local language (Kivikuru, 2017). 
Among Kenyan youth, social media are the primary source of news and information (60% daily), 
while television (28%) is the second (Wangari, 2017). However, the credibility of newspapers 
remains high among well-educated youngsters. In focus group discussions with Moi University 
 7 
 
students (November 2015), Master’s students in particular emphasized the importance of the 
print media, although their own daily media use did not regularly include newspapers.3 These 
students seemed to make a distinction between the values of their professional lives, which 
included newspapers, and their own everyday practise that circled around social media. They 
emphasized that newspapers are the most credible medium. They also referred often to radio, but 
these young adults were not at all interested in television. 
Social media: Limited activism 
About 20 million Kenyans have access to the internet, but few of them use it for discussions and 
those that do it are mainly based on cities. WhatsApp and Facebook rank among the most-used 
platforms (Wangari, 2017). Young urban dwellers have also found in Facebook a platform that can 
give them access to political information in formats that are appealing to them. They have been 
able to mobilise themselves online and push for a political agenda (Otiene & Mukhiongo, 2013). 
Certain protests have become symbols of social media culture and online resistance in Kenya. 
These new forms of resistance have created new avenues of mobilization and protest. Social 
media sites include ‘Occupy parliament’, ‘My dress my choice’ and ‘Occupy playground’.4 
There is evidence that the online space is becoming increasingly institutionalised as a platform for 
popular expression, while the mainstream media’s regime tends to close its ears to outsider voices 
(Ogola, 2015). The new media thus afford users – mainly young people in urban centres – the 
opportunity to mobilise protests and lobby groups, but they also alienate those segments of 
society that do not have access to social media. 
Discussion: From static to fluid?  
A superficial review suggests that although the Kenyan mediascape has not yet radically changed 
with the introduction of the ICT, there are several change processes emerging in parallel on 
various levels, all carrying an include/exclude element. The components of these processes include 
both material factors and meaningful expressions. These processes may appear to lack clear 
boundaries, but they are still amenable to analysis and study. In a society that cherishes social 
stability, aspects of these emerging processes may appear worrying and perhaps even alarming.  
In the following discussion, some of these aspects will be discussed against the background 
metaphor of assemblage.  
Policy implementation moulds culture 
Donors and financiers have been interested in the promotion of ICT in Kenya, but naturally have 
their own ideas about the shape and direction of Kenya’s domestic development policies.  
Researchers (e.g. Etta, 2005) claim that African politics and policymaking are less home-grown 
today than in the 1960s and 1970s. The main reason for the lack of independent politics is the 
                                                          
3 Four focus groups comprising a total of 22 Moi University students participated in these discussions in mid-
November 2015. 
 
4 The ‘Occupy parliament’ movement came about after members of parliament raised their salaries, the dress 
movement after three women accused of indecent dressing were stripped on the streets of Nairobi and the 
playground movement after a school playground in Nairobi was grabbed by a developer who intended to use the land 
as a car park. 
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Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) implemented in African countries in the 1970s and 
1980s. The SAPs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have tailored social 
planning in Africa. Donors also make their voices heard. ‘In no other of contemporary endeavour is 
the influence of donors more evident than in ICT policy planning. Most policy work […] has been or 
is being funded by donors’, says Etta (2005, p. 9). The danger exists that modes of ICT that do not 
strongly support democracy and citizen rights are promoted simply because these dimensions 
have proved useful in the industrialised world. ICT thus tends to be interpreted as a phenomenon 
like electricity, the same everywhere and taking the same mode in any society. 
The generalised ‘common good’ ideology presented in the policy documents about ICT is rational 
only if the ICT administration is assumed to be a consistent, mainly technical process. Elements 
linked to democracy and citizen well-being are mentioned, although these dimensions remain 
abstract and diffuse. For example, nothing bad can be said about the digital literacy goal, meant to 
be completed by digitalizing the whole school system. However, this goal, as well as several 
others, does not seem to be aligned with the realities of the society it is meant to be implemented 
in.  
The choice of emphasis areas shows the aim of domestication in education, services and capacity 
building. However, the volume of the challenges accepted, especially in eEducation, is unrealistic. 
Even when implemented in stages, training the teachers and acquiring the equipment is a huge 
challenge. As already seen, the digitalization goal has widened the gap between private and public 
schools and increased inequality between wealthy and poor counties. Although the project 
deadline is only two years away, as few as between five and seven per cent of Kenyan public 
primary schools have the equipment, curricula and competent teachers for digital education. In 
addition, scandals have complicated the process, as often happens in Kenya when big sums of 
money are involved. The inclusion/exclusion dimension is biased towards exclusion and increased 
imbalance among the population. 
The services objective has been more successful, especially in the establishment of Huduma 
Centres, although the range of their activities is limited, sharpening the difference between urban 
and rural areas. Undoubtedly, the aim of cutting bureaucracy and corruption is relevant, and it can 
be assumed that online services and increased transparency will strengthen people’s interest in 
public matters. In this way, a stronger inclusion element is dominant. Increased connectedness has 
been found in a similar project in rural Malaysia (Alias et al., 2015 pp. 233-263). 
Ironically, the private sector (Vodafone) has been extremely successful with M-Pesa. In less than 
10 years, this branchless banking service has become the most successful mobile-phone-based 
financial service in the developing world.  It has not only expanded the financial freedom of 
grassroots people but also meant a clear change for the better in the everyday life of citizens and 
above all, of women. However, M-Pesa may work to erode the functional norms of some 
communities.  Traditional culture-based behaviour, for example, makes issues related to authority, 
privacy and trust complicated. Communities have been driven to the stage of liminality (Turner, 
1974), to a threshold stage of uncertainty. Social hierarchies may be reversed or temporarily 
dissolved, continuity of tradition may become uncertain and future outcomes once taken for 
granted may be thrown into doubt. Thus, there is a looming possibility that the stability of local 
communities may be shaken.  
At the grassroots level, ICT implementation meets cultural problems. There is already a cultural 
divide in Kenya, opening doors for some but also breaking down old culture-based values and 
practices. When communities based on sharing and a consistent social order meet new 
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technology, the changes go far deeper than the value-free interaction of humans and machines. A 
system of values, hierarchies and inherited traditions is challenged by the new problems brought 
by individualised behaviour. For example, respect for age, seniority and gender difference is 
shaken. Problems are caused by the combination of old and new practices, such as the difficulties 
of ensuring privacy in shared telephone use. Gender differences and age hierarchies do not 
disappear, but their profiles change as people are more and more tied to technology that they 
cannot afford. Inequalities do not disappear with M-Pesa, and they may even be exacerbated.  
M-Pesa has created micro and macro dichotomies, which Leah Komen (2016, 2015) has studied. 
Based on her ethnographic interviews in Marakwet in western Kenya, Komen views mobile money 
as a socio-economic assemblage. According to her, M-Pesa should not to be studied as a mobile 
phone success story or simply as an application enabling the transfer of money. Rather, it should 
be seen as a multi-layered system of government policies and financial institutions. While it is a 
banking platform encouraging people to remit their savings, it also involves all the commercial 
implications that come with mobile phone ownership, sharing and charging systems. This 
dimension of the change processes indicates that an investment in services alone does not pay off. 
On various levels, M-Pesa has appeared as a double-edged sword, on the one hand liberating 
women financially but on the other, encouraging fraudulent activities and mischief. Both inclusion 
and exclusion elements are embedded in this process, but most attention has been given to the 
element of inclusion. 
The emergence of ICT-based services cannot abolish the contradictions between urban and rural 
conditions. The digital divide or ‘digital poverty’ in the country – situations in which people either 
cannot afford an ICT service or lack the skills to use one (Obijiofor, 2015) –  is a complex 
phenomenon. Attempts to balance contradictions, such as the establishment of the Huduma 
Centre system, may even create irritation (Focus groups, November 2015). Huduma Centres 
operate well in county capitals, but villages can be remote from these. The coming of this 
improved service creates bitterness among those who are not privileged to share its benefits. 
Well-educated urban dwellers are included, while the rural poor remain on the fringes of the new 
service.  
If scrutinised more in detail, the main objectives and arguments around ICT policies resemble the 
declarative style of ITU, UNESCO and other international actors dealing with ICT issues. This 
supports Florence Etta’s (2005) claim that African societies do not properly domesticate their 
social goals. The ICT sector clearly demands huge amounts of external funding, and Kenyan actors 
have to take into account what ‘sells’ well among donors. Funding for education does this but so 
might freedom of expression, especially among public international supporters of it. Externally 
funded ICT programmes may not recognize Kenyan sensitivities about freedom of expression. 
Unfettered social media campaigns may ignite social unrest. ICT programmes that look good from 
outside the country may actually trigger problems inside it. The Kenyan authorities are careful 
about this; the social unrest of past years is well remembered. On the other hand, decision-makers 
might have inherited an oversized social memory of unrest and disorder, and hence, for example, 
ICT has been kept separate from media policies.  
Again, macro and micro dichotomies can be perceived. ICT has increased the volume of service-
based information, but firm control remains over how information is used. Society is willing to 
open ICT doors only to the service dimension. A further issue is whether policy directives alone will 
be able to control freedom of expression when the volume and flow of information within society 
increases.  
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Media: Technology changes voices  
Levi Obijiofor (2015, pp. 78-80) has proposed that the emergence of new technologies has not 
helped African public service media. Globalization and new technology have resulted in a 
deregulated market that has spawned greater competition and multiple platforms for news 
production and delivery to consumers. The case of Kenya is complicated, but it follows this 
formula. In principle, digital migration would allow the introduction of county radio and television, 
but Kenya does not have a strong tradition of public media with a mandate to offer content for 
public interest. The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) is burdened with successive decades of 
political interference and poor management. Today, KBC is required to compete on an equal 
footing with commercial stations. As a result, content that strictly serves the public interest has 
been put aside (Interrogating Public Service Media, 2016). The inclusion factor has so far been 
weak. 
On the other hand, commercial companies are not eager to change their programming criteria. 
While the emergence of ICT-based channels has driven both regulators and media practitioners in 
the industrialised West to recognize the local as something that deserves special consideration 
(Ali, 2017, pp. 6-29), such a tendency is not found in Kenya. This may be due to the tradition that 
journalism has historically been strongly capital-city oriented, and local-area focussed journalism is 
easily suspected of bringing ethnic contradictions to the fore. Although the number of media 
channels has grown, the inclusion factor is not prominent among media producers. The online 
pages of any media institution are not conspicuously inclusive, and although they would welcome 
an increase in audience numbers, people in poor rural areas are not a tempting target audience 
for either the public or private media.  
The choice of available media has grown, channels have multiplied, and radio listening has to a 
large extent moved from radio sets to mobile phones. The process continues, and the outcome is 
not yet clear. However, one conclusion can be drawn. Attempts to maintain ethnic balance and 
strengthen national unity seem to become more and more difficult, at least in the field of 
broadcasting. The growth of big, strong radio stations has stopped, while small vernacular-
language stations grow in popularity. At the same time, television, with its middle-class values, is 
getting more and more space in urban settings and new local-language television stations are 
starting, thanks to digital transmission.  
The situation is fascinating, and the outcome is not clear. Media institutions are not strongly 
motivated to strengthen inclusion, but inclusion is promoted by technological changes, especially 
among the youth. At the same time, community-based media choices are at least partly mediated 
by individual choices. However, genuine, inside the community born community media with a 
broad participatory agenda are rare. Many local media are distinctly linked to ethnic interests. 
-- 
Social media: A promise or a change agent? 
Online services have started well in Kenya, although the private sector seems to be more active in 
locating new business options than the public sector, which has more limited funds. The research 
evidence about the impact of social media, especially among the youth in Kenya, is intriguingly 
contradictory. Some authors (e.g. Mäkinen & Kuira, 2008) have noted that the social media were 
‘not innocent’ in the demonstrations after the 2007 elections. The authors believe that social 
media functioned as alternative media for citizens to promote democratization, although violence 
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took over in the unrest and all paths to democratic participation were dramatically cut off. Otieno 
and Mukhongo (2013) concluded that social media provide a possibility for social mobilization and 
alertness, especially for Kenyan youth. On the other hand, these early experiences of the use (or 
misuse) of social media in fact operate against its general acceptance, not only among those in 
power. Ordinary people also remember the bloody violence. 
While assessing social media in Kenya, some researchers (e.g. Wynche et al., 2013) emphasize 
infrastructure problems, local market constraints and unreliable electricity in villages, but even 
more, the ‘demands of persistent poverty’ and based on it, the lack of real online participation. 
Using Facebook makes a person feel ‘advanced,’ but the cost factor makes Facebook a rarity; often 
interviewees seemed to exaggerate their use of it. Facebook has become a marker of social 
prestige. According to the authors, there was no space left for participation and mobilization 
through the Internet. They believe that Facebook might develop into a useful gadget for small-
scale business but not genuine participation. In short, digital poverty stands as a hindrance to 
inclusion. 
In focus group discussions with Moi University students, many participants admitted that their 
social media use created disagreements and fights when they visited home. Although they might 
use a smartphone similar or even identical to their parents’ phone, they used it in a different way. 
The liked ‘hanging’ on online sites and chatting with their pals in Facebook, while their parents 
used their phone only for short calls, occasional SMS messages and M-Pesa. The time spent with 
social media – being present but mentally ‘away’ – seemed to especially irritate their parents. 
Some students also said that they had been recruited to demonstrations about tuition fees 
organized through Facebook groups. The ‘Nairobi unrest’ (mentioned above) did not interest these 
students living in Eldoret, but they were aware of it (Focus groups, November 2015). The 
inclusion/exclusion dimension took a different profile here in the grassroots experience.  
Njorore’s study (2013) gave similar results. She found that Facebook and WhatsApp were the 
favourites of the students who participated in her survey. They appreciated the freedom of choice 
which the social media gave and the rapidity of contacts available, but they also had mixed 
feelings about spending extensive time with social media. They felt that the time spent with social 
media could be considered by others, and partly also themselves, as a waste of time or laziness, 
preventing people from reading books and studying properly. 
In case studies about the role of social media in ‘Occupy Wall Street’ and the Arab Spring 
(Sorochan, 2016; York, 2016), the contradictions involved are discussed more generally. The 
authors emphasize that to develop genuine participatory democracy, education in democratic 
attitudes as well as practical skills are necessary. Without this, many forms of digital 
communication become selectively inclusive, creating new digital elite groups. From this 
perspective, the Kenyan government’s emphasis on digital education is very relevant as a long-
term plan, although its goals seem to stress skills rather than democratic values. But as a short-
term solution, social media alone hardly increase democracy. The researchers suggest that with 
social media alone, political changes are not possible; fundamental economic transformation is 
needed (Sorochan, 2016, pp. 24-26). If online participation is elevated as a central principle of a 
movement’s politics, this participatory complex may actually stand in the way of democratic 
practice. 
Media ecology: Community turning into a puzzle 
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There is a difference between a conventional rural community and an assemblage constellation, a 
village with new avenues opened by the smartphone. Both are bottom/up structures, but a 
community is built on cultural ties developed over time, strengthening stability and resistance to 
change, while an assemblage is characterized with mobility and fluidity. Thus, a system of values, 
hierarchies and inherited traditions is challenged, mixed with ‘new’ problems brought by 
individualised behaviour. Continuities are breaking or turning fragile. Accordingly, the fears felt by 
decision-makers are to a certain extent justified or at least understandable. From the perspective 
of those in power – the ones pushing the ICT boom -- the communities become less controllable. 
As in many other African countries, Kenyan society has several social orders, one on top of the 
other. Like an American sandwich, these layers are colourful and multiple, but they hardly touch 
each other and follow different sets of social rules. It is perhaps justified to say that Kenya is more 
a state than a nation, distinctly a top/down society, reasonably effective but distant for the 
individual citizen. The connectivity aspect of ICT development does not seem to have changed the 
situation. Citizens still get most of their social support from the sphere of locality and tradition-
based conventions. However, this very sphere has remained on the fringes of recent ICT related 
developments, outside the public attention.  
The ICT hub ideology and its implementation have touched the layers of social order in different 
ways, while those promoting the ICT policies have viewed the ICT hype as a separate, 
distinguishable dimension of social development, not causing changes in other basic power 
relations. But parts and wholes are clearly changing positions, thus indicating that assemblage has 
snatched a space in Kenyan society today. There are several indicators of assemblage and the 
dynamic rotation of parts and wholes in society. 
First, the speed of changes caused by ICT related processes varies. The more technically oriented 
changes promote fast movement, while the socio-cultural norms change slowly. The ICT phase has 
brought unpredictable future social developments. Thus, a balanced media ecology is not easy to 
reach in a society which appreciates social stability to the extent of being ready to limit individual 
freedoms when it feels the need.  
Both the state-supported ICT projects and the media are expanding their services and reaching 
larger groups than ever before, and this process is strengthening. Superficially, public projects seek 
the common good, while the private media may be assumed to develop their practices based on 
market interests. However, the division is not that simple. Public projects are often dependent on 
outside financing and thus represent compromises; genuine Kenyan priorities might be put aside. 
In the media sphere, public and private media do compete, and this situation is present in many 
ICT-based solutions, often promoting compromises.  
 
On both sides, the process to date resembles ICT adoption in many other countries, giving support 
to Etta’s (2005) views. Domestication remains limited, although public implementers might be 
more favourable towards home-made solutions today. For example, in Kenya the Swahili language 
is a national glue countering ethnic contradictions, and it could be promoted in journalism and the 
services branch. With the exception of radio, it has been given little attention in present-day 
developments. The slow but clear expansion of Swahili in society is tolerated but not promoted.  
Carol Myers-Scotton (e.g. 1971) has shown in her intriguing sociolinguistic studies about African 
multilingualism, how complicated language choices are not only for decision-makers but also for 
the social identity of people. In Kenya, all the other vernacular languages are linked to ethnicity 
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and accordingly treated with suspicion. However, the broader public favours media which speak 
their own language. Frequently, the use of a particular language brings with a different, home-
made set of news values and vocabulary that invite ‘ordinary people’ into public matters. 
 
The same applies to locality. Mobile journalists are today able to cover local events in Kenya, but 
these are not found newsworthy. This phenomenon is difficult for outsiders to grasp because ICT 
based developments in other countries have brought in a renaissance of localism. However, it 
becomes more understandable from the standpoint of nation-building, which is still quite fresh in 
the minds of power-holders. Quite evidently, locality is one of the dimensions of ICT hub 
development that deserves special attention. Developing services in the rural areas is relevant, but 
the inclusion of rural residents in democratic processes requires more; it requires attention to the 
issues found significant by rural communities. Contradictions in the social arena cannot be avoided 
by mouthing the abstract rhetoric of democracy.  
 
The power base seems unchanged since before the invasion of ICT technologies. The aim of public 
ICT policies is to intensify information distribution and increase transparency in a wide range of e-
projects. During the implementation phases, as long as tribal tensions are mixed with politics, 
state organs remain extremely sensitive to ethnicity-related issues. Concrete ethnicity-related 
traditions and the everyday practices of the grassroots tend to escape public attention, as do 
power relations within households and local networks and between genders and generations. The 
assumption of policy-makers seems to be that improved service structures can be developed 
without any changes in cultural conventions. This appears to be impossible, as Komen’s  (2015, 
2016) studies suggest. 
Public and private media institutions are unbending in their practices and value judgments. Many 
options made possible by improved ICT potential remain unused. For example, the strong urban 
orientation of news programmes remains dominant, although technically more diversity is 
possible in journalism. As Peter Dahlgren (2001, p. 85) has stated, connection with the public 
involves values, affinity, knowledge, practices, identities and discussion. A medium which has 
inherited such a complex journalistic mode at least partly reflects these ‘firstborn rights’, even 
under a different organisational and technical rule. If the firstborn is a medium that has close 
contacts with the power elite, it is difficult to alter the status quo.  
 
Perhaps the most fascinating trends in ICT-promoted changes in media use – so far vague and 
diffuse, but recognizable – are the signs of increased individualization in media culture. Jo Helle-
Valle (2017) quite justifiably emphasizes that media should not be placed in the centre when 
media use is studied. People’s everyday lives should be the point of departure. We should ask how 
people relate to media. Until now, media use has been a social experience in Kenyan media 
cultures. Authorities at home have had a say in the way media are used, but the voice of changed 
technology has been stronger than the government guidance trying to contain it. 
Social media can open new avenues of information and participation and is sure to be an essential 
part of the Kenyan mediascape of the future. For the time being, however, the social media are 
the most unpredictable element, sharpening contradictions and provoking abrupt changes. The 
social media have become a new knowledge instrument for new types of elites and especially for 
youth, thus enabling, at least in the long run, some restructuring of power. But in the short run, 
social media alone cannot develop a totally new political situation. Hopes of the Huduma Centres’ 
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power to strengthen citizenry and interest in public matters will take time to realise, if indeed such 
change will ever be possible.  
 
However, the experience of freedom of expression and mobilisation may spread to a sphere about 
which society is extremely concerned. Decision-makers as well as ordinary citizens well remember 
the violence experienced 10 years ago and last autumn. In the future, one-issue movements might 
shake not only the strongholds of political power but also the shaky ethnic balance, and that very 
fact might create successive episodes of political unrest. Such a situation would hardly be 
favourable to freedom of expression. The promotion of the ICT hub has impacted society more 
deeply than expected by experts. ICT cannot be viewed as a single process separate from politics, 
culture, tradition and ethnicity. Some of the elements that it brings into the picture appear as 
worrying, if not frightening in the eyes of both decision-makers and citizens. The only way of 
meeting the future is by keeping our eyes open and turning the focus to the grassroots. Many 
hierarchies are shaking because of the assemblage brought by the ICT hype.  
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